novelty than has been assumed, while the peace and harmony associated with the 1970s are more an illusion than a reality. In this earlier period there were also moments of acute social tension and important street mobilizations; the difference is that they did not seriously undermine the legitimacy of the political system, its principal actors, or the state structure whose foundations had been established in 1958.
RECENT PROTESTS: VISIBILITY AND CHARACTERISTICS
In response to the macroeconomic adjustment program announced by Carlos Andres Perez's recently installed government (1989-1993), a massive social uprising shook Caracas and the other principal Venezuelan cities between February 27 and March 3, 1989. The Caracazo, as it came to be known, was a popular protest that stands out in recent Venezuelan history for its duration, geographical scope, intensity, and violence.' The disturbances revealed the extent to which the legitimacy of the political system had been undermined. Indeed, they contributed to a political crisis soon to be reflected in the frustrated military coups of 1992 and the removal of President P6rez in 1993. This uprising had been preceded in October 1988 by another violent incident (less well-known outside Venezuela) that also contributed to a questioning of the legitimacy of the Venezuelan state: the Amparo massacre. Venezuelan police and military forces had assassinated a group of villagers on a fishing trip near the Colombian border and presented the incident as an encounter with a Colombian guerrilla group. The unanticipated survival of two of the villagers and the subsequent mobilization of the local community brought the truth to light and provoked widespread indignation. These two episodes represented a turning point for popular protest in Venezuela and oblige us to examine a phenomenon that has always existed but previously received little attention: "street politics." By this we mean interaction in a public space between social and political actors (including the multitude) and various representatives of the state. Those who opt for street politics are, above all, the social sectors most distant from the centers of power (Eckstein, 1989: 28) .
As a result of the Caracazo, Provea (a nongovernment organization for the defense of human rights) was founded and began to publish annual reports on the human rights situation in the country, including detailed monitoring of the right to demonstrate peacefully in the streets. Thanks to this initiative, we now have a reasonably reliable source of information on popular demonstra-tions during the past decade and a half: how many there were, the actors involved, their motives, and the response of the authorities.
More recently, additional information has been made available as the result of an independent academic initiative of the Central University of Venezuela: the creation of a database on popular demonstrations, the BDEBP, that is designed eventually to cover the entire twentieth century. While Provea draws on a variety of national and regional newspapers to feed its database, the BDEBP's coverage is more restricted: it registers the information available in just one of the national dailies (El Nacional) since its founding in 1944 and that available in other dailies for earlier years. Nevertheless, the information registered in the BDEBP is more detailed than that of Provea and, as noted, covers a far longer period. We have sufficient information from these two sources to examine the demonstrations in recent years and compare them with those that took place before the Caracazo.
Despite their well-known limitations, newspaper sources have been increasingly accepted as a useful contribution to research on social conflict (Tarrow, 1989: 357-365; Franzosi, 1996: 377). However, we need to bear in mind the characteristics of this kind of source, together with the differences between the two databases we are using. As already mentioned, both databases rely on information offered by the newspapers and therefore to some extent reflect their limitations as a source. The daily press tends to register what is considered "newsworthy" and will therefore give preference to conflictive or violent events rather than to those with more routine characteristics. Editorial policy also affects coverage and may change over time, modifying the frequency and the way in which protests are reported. At the same time, our two databases are designed differently. Provea registers protest incidents, while in the BDEBP the reference is to the news items that appeared in El Nacional. Furthermore, Provea's annual reports cover from October to September of the following year. As a result, the numbers offered by the two sources are not strictly comparable. Nevertheless, since we are not aiming at precise quantification, the information available is sufficient to give us a reliable general picture of the characteristics of popular protest in Venezuela before and after the Caracazo.
According to Provea, during the 14 years from October 1989 to September 2003 there were 12,889 protests in the country, an average of 2.52 per day, including weekends and holidays (see Table 1 what has become known as "Black Friday," the Luis Herrera government devalued the national currency and introduced exchange controls, in the process revealing the dimensions of the economic crisis and contributing to the victory of the opposition candidate, Jaime Lusinchi, in the presidential elections in December. As in the case of Provea, the BDEBP reflects the peak provoked by the Caracazo and the increase in mobilizations during the early years of the Chaivez administration.
In the BDEBP, the protests reviewed are classified in terms of three categories: conventional, confrontational, and violent (Table 2) . Conventional actions are everyday protests that do not provoke fear or anxiety among participants, observers, and the authorities. Confrontational actions are those that provoke fear and anxiety but without involving physical aggression or damage to property and include roadblocks, unauthorized combative demonstrations and marches, and hunger strikes. Finally, violent protests are those that provoke damage or destruction of public or private property and/or affect the physical integrity of persons, whether participants or not. The greater incidence and visibility of confrontational and violent protests-particularly confrontational ones-indicate that the society is undergoing a period of turbulence and/or socio-political transformation (Tarrow, 1989).
The first striking fact is that the items reporting violent protests, less than 10 percent of the total in the earliest years of the series, consistently register two-digit percentages after 1986. Violence peaks in 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 as a result of the political crisis during the second Pdrez government and again in 1995-1996. This second period corresponds to the implementation of the economic adjustment program known as the Agenda Venezuela. From then on, the tendency is for the percentage of violent protests to decline.
The definition of "violent protests" adopted by the BDEBP naturally includes those subject to state repression. Provea, as an organization dedicated to the defense of human rights, offers a detailed, year-by-year report on the mobilizations that were repressed by the state.2 According to the Provea information, during Pdrez's second term (1989-1993) violent state repression of protest was commonplace. One of every three nonviolent protests was repressed, with an elevated cost in human lives. In addition to the atrocious repression during the Caracazo, 26 deaths were registered as a result of peaceful demonstrations in the days following the abortive February 1992 coup.
Modifications in the patterns of official response to peaceful demonstrations were evident during the second Caldera administration (1994-1998), when levels of repression were lower. At the same time, the emergence of new political actors in the regional and local governments led to changes of attitude toward peaceful demonstrations. The criminalization of protest, which dated back to the 1960s, when it formed part of the response to the armed struggle, now became less common as a result of new efforts to submit cases of repression to a body of rules (L6pez Maya, 2003b) . Toward the middle of Caldera's term the proportion of demonstrations repressed had fallen to one of every six. Deaths in public demonstrations were also fewer, and in 1996 not one was registered. There was also less evidence of the use of arms in demonstrations. The BDEBP also classifies the protests on the basis of their motives, using more than 90 different categories. For present purposes, we have classified them into two broad groups: socioeconomic and civic/political (Table 3) . (The lack of coincidence between these totals and those registered in Table 2 is due to the fact that a protest may have various motives and may therefore be registered in both of our two broad groups.) An overwhelming majority of the protests are motivated by socioeconomic concerns. However, in a few isolated years those that reflect civic and political concerns account for more than a third of the total. Although a detailed analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that the dates coincide with moments in which there were particularly high levels of political agitation. Between 1986 and 1988 there were important mobilizations in favor of political reforms, particularly those related to the process of decentralization. These demonstrations helped to produce the climate necessary for support of the reforms recommended by the Comisi6n Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado (Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State-COPRE) that led to the legislation favoring decentralization (G6mez Calcafio and L6pez Maya, 1990) . The first abortive military coup took place in 1992, and 1998-1999, the first year of the Chaivez government, was subject to massive mobilizations in favor of the constituent assembly. To examine these motives in greater detail, we have divided each of the two broad groups into three subgroups (Table 4 ). The first subgroup (A) of the socioeconomic group includes motives related to productive activity such as the demand for access to land, subsidies, credits, taxes, and so forth. The second (B) covers those concerns related to public services, health, education, water, transportation, and so forth. The third (C) groups together the motives related to income: wages, collective contracts, pensions, work, and so forth. The motives of a civic and political nature are divided into a first subgroup (A) that covers human rights, repression, killings, mistreatment, and so forth; subgroup (B) that includes motives related to civil rights, justice, freedom of expression, laws, regulations, and so forth; and a subgroup (C) made up of explicitly political concerns such as election fraud, democratization, autonomy, and corruption. Within the socioeconomic group, the most important motives are those concerned with income and public services; between them, they consistently account for more than 70 percent of the total. In 11 of the 16 annual periods examined, the main concern is income. Within the broad range of civic and political motives, in 13 of the 16 years the predominant theme is human rights, and in 11 of them these account for more than half of the respective totals. To sum up, these recent years have been characterized by elevated levels of protest that, according to Provea, amount to an average of more than two demonstrations per day, including holidays and weekends, even (until the 2001-2002 report) without taking into account work stoppages, one of the most important forms of protest in Venezuela. After the mid-1980s, the percentage of protests registered in the BDEBP as violent is generally in the twodigit range, although there is a tendency for it to decline during the late 1990s, largely as a result of a change in the attitude of the state toward the right to demonstrate. The forms of protest characterized as confrontational were less than a quarter of the total prior to the Caracazo but subsequently rose to a yearly average of about a third of the total for the 1990s and reached 43 percent for the second half of that decade. This tendency suggests a society in which power relationships are undergoing a transformation. As we have seen, the most important motives for protesting throughout these years are the cost of living and public services, but toward the end of the 1990s protests other civic and political issues begin to increase in number. Of the latter, the majority are related to human rights and the defense of citizens' personal dignity and physical integrity.
PROTEST SINCE 1958 IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
To examine the extent to which the characteristics of protest of recent years can be considered a novelty, we need to consider the evidence available on protest in the decades immediately following 1958. Juan Carlos Rey (1989), a renowned Venezuelan political scientist, considers the apparent passivity of the masses one of the basic reasons for the successful functioning of the Venezuelan political system during the decades that precede the period we have been discussing. With the overthrow of the Perez Jim6nez dictatorship in January 1958, there followed a series of democratic governments that were to be considered a model for the rest of Latin America. Shortly after the Caracazo, Rey argued that Venezuelan democracy rested on the consolidation of a limited number of large and highly disciplined political party organizations that fostered political stability by establishing among themselves a relationship that avoided zero-sum situations. The politicians who promoted the pact on which Venezuela's democracy was based had feared that, if popular demands were not channeled by the political parties, the system would be uncontrollable and could even collapse. Avoiding a zero-sum situation was made possible as a result of the resources available to the state from oil revenue. Thus, according to Rey, the stability of Venezuela's democracy depended on the demobilization and lack of participation of the masses. From what we have already said, it is apparent that, at least in recent years, the restraints on mobilization and participation have been seriously undermined.
In another influential analysis of the Venezuelan political system, Mois6s Naim and Ram6n Pifiango comment that "the first decades of the democratic experience reveal a surprising absence of permanent open conflicts" (1984: 553). They argue that open conflict appeared not to be an essential element in the prevailing social dynamics and that processes provoking serious traumas in other countries had in Venezuela occurred free of major turbulence. As examples they point to the way in which the armed conflict of the 1960s gave way to pacification in the 1970s and the prevalence of harmonious labor relations.
Steve Ellner (1995) has argued, however, that, while such analyses have a certain basis, exaggerating them has led to the adoption of misleading and even erroneous conclusions. In contrast, the assertions by Naim, Pifiango, and others suggest that mobilizations were infrequent before the mid-1980s and scarcely relevant to an understanding of the dynamics of the society. It has also been argued that the protests during the initial stages of the post-1958 democratic experience were more ideologically motivated and less concerned with everyday conditions of life and that they were less intense and conflictive than in the more recent period we have examined (Ram6n Escobar Salom, personal communication, May 23, 1997) . To what extent are these assertations true?
The BDEBP is not yet complete in its coverage of popular protest for the post-1958 period, so we have opted for examining the information available for two years in each of the succeeding decades to establish comparisons. What we are interested in is the frequency of the protests, their characteristics, and their motives. Because the information available is not exhaustive, we have chosen not to adopt sophisticated criteria for the choice of the years to be examined. We have simply taken, for each decade, an election year and a nonelection year. We opted for 1958 and 1959, for example, because, apart from the general criteria, they cover the initial experiences of the recently installed political system, and for the 1990s we have used 1998 and 1999 (the first year of the Chavez government). As we have explained, what we are looking for is not statistical precision but rather an estimate of the frequency and characteristics of the protests.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom even among those of us who have studied recent popular mobilizations, the data do not reveal appreciable differences in the frequency of protests registered between the earlier decades and the more recent years examined in detail above. If we take the period prior to the 1980s (keeping in mind that the quantification cannot be considered precise), we have an annual average of 356 protests registered, appreciably more than what is registered in Table 1 The idea that protests and mobilizations were less violent in earlier decades is simply an illusion (Table 5) . While it is true that in the initial two years of the democratic period violent protests represented less than 10 percent of the total, they were more frequent in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, 1963 was particularly violent in that it was an election year in which the political forces committed to the armed struggle called for a policy of abstention. The confrontation between the Betancourt government and the rebels was intense and violent, and this situation undoubtedly accounts for the numbers registered. For the years covered, the numbers registered for confrontational conflicts are erratic. Understandably, by limiting our coverage to two years per decade, we can hardly expect to register any trends. However, there are two years, 1959 and 1970, in which confrontational protests are more than a third of the respective totals. Only on the basis of long-term and uninterrupted annual series could we identify prolonged periods of turbulence like that of the late 1990s, but the possibility cannot be discarded. Finally, the more conventional protests are a majority in six of the ten years we have chosen and, just as we have seen in Table 2 , tend to be less visible in years that register elevated levels of political turbulence. With regard to the motives for the protests (Table 6) Looking more closely at the motives in play (Table 7) , we find that concerns about living standards and public services account for more than 80 percent of the total, with those related to living standards the more important of the two. Among the protests motivated by civic or political considerations, those that are strictly political (democracy, corruption, elections, politics, autonomy, etc.) are the most numerous in three of the first six years. This marks a difference from the post-1980s period, when concern over human rights was the most prevalent motive.
CONCLUSIONS
Popular protest, which has become such an important everyday ingredient of social experience in Venezuela since the 1980s, is much less of a novelty than many believed. The frequency of protests in earlier decades is similar to if not greater than that registered during the most recent decade and a half. At the same time, despite minor differences in emphasis, the motives for protesting are the same.
Nevertheless, it is important to underline the differences that we have detected. From 1958 until the early 1970s, there was a greater numerical equilibrium between protests stimulated by socioeconomic considerations and those motivated by civic and political considerations. From then on, the former are much more numerous than the latter. Furthermore, in the early years of the democratic experience, of those protests stimulated by civic and political considerations, those that are strictly political in nature are the most common. This evidently reflects the climate of political turbulence during the first decade of the democratic period; by the 1970s the hegemony exercised by those who had signed the 1958 pact had been firmly established. In Provea's most recent reports there are signs that we have once again entered a turbulent phase: during the past four years the number of politically motivated protests has clearly been increasing in both absolute and relative terms, and many of the protests that are presented as prompted by socioeconomic considerations are also politically motivated. Indeed, we are witnessing once again a struggle for hegemony that has yet to be resolved.
The resolution of the struggle for hegemony in favor of those who signed the political pacts at the outset of the democratic period strengthened the legitimacy of the system and of its principal actors. These circumstances, together with the oil boom during the same decade, explain at least in part the generalized sensation of social peace and harmony that is reflected in the notion of Venezuelan society as devoid of open conflict. This view lends itself to the exceptionalism thesis regarding Venezuelan society. The evidence offered by the BDEBP indicates that in the early 1980s protests largely assumed conventional forms.4 From a longer historical perspective, however, this was not a normal situation but rather a brief "truce." Historical circum-stances of social and cultural exclusion that had not been resolved, together with the deteriorating living conditions of the general populace once the oil boom had passed, renewed the pressures for a new cycle of conflict and political struggle. Nevertheless, there are indications of changes in the political demands typical of the more recent protests. Since the Amparo massacre and, even more so, the Caracazo, there has been an advance in public consciousness and repudiation of violations of human rights.
Protest is and has always been an important aspect of Venezuelan society, and it is seriously misleading to highlight passive behavior on the part of the popular sectors during prolonged periods. What does change, however, is the role of protest in the dynamics of the society. In periods of struggle over hegemony, street politics contributes directly to a questioning of the established power structure, and this is reflected in changes in its characteristics and motives. In these situations it becomes more confrontational and violent and the strictly political considerations come to the fore. During periods in which hegemonic control is not in question and the system enjoys relative legitimacy and stability, protests motivated by socioeconomic considerations are by far the most common. At the same time, those to whom the demands are directed have far more room for maneuver. In contrast with the situation in the 1960s, when protest was criminalized and energetically repressed, thus contributing to spiraling violence, since the mid-1980s and above all during the Chivez government this criminalization has diminished together with the violence. As a result, the hegemonic struggle is now being waged primarily on the basis of what this article calls "confrontational" collective action.
Between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s, the Venezuelan state depended on extraordinary levels of oil revenue to maintain protest at bay. Its capacity for overcoming conflict contributed to a disarticulation of attempts by independent popular sectors to organize themselves. Frequently, protest was a mere prelude to negotiations between trade-union bureaucrats and political parties or state institutions. Despite high levels of protest, this pattern could not open real prospects of creating solid social movements or organizations. However, with the sustained economic deterioration and the undermining of the legitimacy of the political system, especially during the late 1980s, the situation was transformed. Protest returned to center stage in the political struggle, and socioeconomic demands could no longer be countered by relying on the clientelistic and corporative mechanisms of the past. The conditions have been created for transcending protest and establishing an autonomous dynamic for popular movements and social organizations.
More recently, new elements that have not been discussed in this study have complicated this already complex situation. Since the last months of 2001, sectors of the upper and middle classes have also taken to the streets.
This new ingredient has made protest even more visible than before because these new sectors have important economic resources and, above all, are backed by the private mass media, which share and promote the aims of the mobilizations. These sectors also face the challenge of improving and consolidating their relationship with the Venezuelan state and democracy.
In the course of this article, we have attempted to shed some light on the complexity of the relationship between state and society in Venezuela as expressed by street politics. By examining the different modalities, characteristics, and motives of the protests from a historical perspective, we have been able to identify continuities and changes in the interaction between popular actors and those closer to the seats of power. We have seen how, in certain periods, the patterns of protest reflect the relative legitimacy of the political system and its actors. The application of this same methodology on a wider scale in Latin America could provide comparative insights capable of enriching the analysis of this relationship, particularly now that street politics is assuming novel, creative forms throughout the continent. 4. In addition to 1983, which is registered in Table 5 
